Migration cooperation in Europe

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1. The scope of the paper

This explanatory note maps migration cooperation in Europe that involves directly Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.\(^1\) It also tries to map possible channels of policy transfer from the EU to its Eastern Neighbourhood. It must be underlined that this part of the mapping exercise is limited to EU-related cooperation. It does not take into account processes in the post-Soviet space (e.g. Shanghai Process, GUAM or BSEC), nor, indeed, UN-level cooperation (IOM, UNDP, UNHCR etc.).

2. Cooperation in the field of migration in Europe

Cooperation on migration issues in Europe has a long tradition and has taken two forms: 1) dialogue and cooperation within international/intergovernmental organizations; 2) cooperation in consultative processes. It started at the fall of the Iron Curtain, developed side by side with the EU migration agenda, and assured policy transfer between the EU Member States, EU candidate states and Eastern Neighbours.

1. Organizations on international level

Council of Europe

Eastern European and South Caucasus states and Russia have been members of the Council of Europe since the 1990s, as their first step to normalisation, democratisation and European integration.\(^2\) (see Annex I). This organization has been and still is perceived outside the EU as a normative power, a source of socialisation to European legal and ideational culture. The Council of Europe, and especially the Committee on Migration, Refugees and the Population of the Parliamentary Assembly, has been very active in the field of migration, providing the space for dialogue, discussion, exchanges of views, best practice, and broadly understood socialization in migration policy issues. Especially throughout the 1990s, the debates on migration flows and proposals for cooperation between European countries, East and West, were very intense and the Council managed to produce important recommendations on a variety of issues, which were adopted by both Western and Eastern European countries.\(^3\) The legal framework of the Council of Europe has been influential for EU policy solutions and their adoption has been a measure of European integration for non-EU European countries. The Council of Europe also played an important role in the creation and works of the Vienna Group (1991-1994), a consultative process sponsored by the Austrian government focusing on migration flows from Central and Eastern European Countries. It served as a place for dialogue, exchange of best practice in asylum policy and migration management through the promotion of its human rights framework and through the creation of new specific standards, e.g. on subsidiary protection.

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\(^1\) The mapping was done through desk studies, expert notes from the Observatory network members and by supporting open-ended expert interviews with the officials of the European Commission, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and ICMPD.

\(^2\) See Legal database at www.carim-east.eu

As recently as 2011, CoE appointed a Migration Coordinator unit. It coordinates the work of several CoE bodies\(^4\) and focuses on three main themes: 1) the integration of migrants (including combating xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination as well as promoting migrants’ participation in and interaction with the receiving societies); 2) the human rights dimension of asylum and return procedures; and 3) the integration of internally displaced persons. The mission is, \textit{inter alia}, to promote CoE human rights standards in these fields, as well as good practice in policy.

The Council of Europe’s Development Bank invested important resources in migration-related projects, making the Council of Europe an important donor in the area of migration and asylum in the 1990s (in the years 1989-1997 the CEDB spent 1,156,680 ECU, almost 11% of the total budget, on projects assisting refugees and migrants, while in 2006-2010 only 177,000 EUR, i.e. 1.5% of the total budget). From among the 7 countries of interest, only Moldova and Georgia have been paying members of the CEDB, tapping its resources for their policy needs.

\textit{Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe}

Another actor important in intergovernmental cooperation on migration and asylum in the region is the OSCE with 56 member states. The members include: European Union member states, Eastern European states, South Caucasus states, the countries of Central Asia and the US and Canada. The Eastern European and South Caucasus countries and Russia have been members since the 1990s.\(^5\) Cooperation on migration has been a part of the OSCE security agenda. Its engagement included workshops and conferences on migration issues as well as study visits and training for Eastern European practitioners, often offered by Western European member states. The OSCE has been closely cooperating with international organisations, especially UNHCR and the IOM. Both organizations support the OSCE in the respective fields of competence, both by organizing events and by implementing OSCE projects. The OSCE has kept up working relations with the European Union, in the areas of mutual interest in the Balkans, the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. These include, \textit{inter alia}, border management and the fight against human trafficking.\(^6\) It is worth mentioning too the work of the Migration Adviser at the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), who has focused on issues such as integration, gender and the social empowerment of migrants.

\textbf{2. Consultative processes}

Europe is a home, or rather the cradle, of consultative processes in the field of migration. Since the launch of the Inter-governmental Consultations (IGC) in 1984, more and more European states have got involved in some form of intergovernmental multilateral dialogue and cooperation, making the policy transfers more efficient.\(^7\)

\(^4\) CoE bodies working on migration issues: Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee of Ministers (CM), Conference of International Non-Governmental Organisations (Conference of INGO's), Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (Congress), Council of Europe Development Bank, Paris (CEB), European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR (CM-EXEC), Group of Experts on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), National Human Rights Structures (NHRS), Unit North-South Center, Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), Special Representative of the Secretary General for Roma Issues (SRSG).

\(^5\) See legal database at www.carim-east.eu

\(^6\) http://www.osce.org/cc/43243

Budapest Process

Arguably the most effective tool of socialisation for the EU agenda on migration has been the Budapest Process.\(^8\) It developed from Berlin Process of 1991 and was officially established in the wake of the Ministerial Conference to Prevent Uncontrolled Migration held in Budapest in 1993. To support the process, the Swiss and Austrian governments sponsored the creation of an intergovernmental organization, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), which became the secretariat of the Budapest Process in 1994. In the years 1993-2003 the Budapest Process focused on Central and Eastern European countries, soon-to-be Accession States. It supported them in their efforts to meet the accession criteria in the field of migration and management, including asylum policy, border controls and anti-trafficking policy. The philosophy of the Budapest Process was from the beginning about dialogue and practical cooperation through workshops, seminars, study visits and twinnings. Frequent and informal meetings favoured policy transfer and capacity building.

In 2003 the Process was re-directed to include the CIS region. The decision was a response to the interest of (especially) new EU MS eager selling their own experience further East, as well as the growing need to fill the empty space for cooperation left by the fading CIS Process (1996-2005). The modalities of work remained the same. In 2010, following the launch of the Prague Process (see below) the Budapest Process was re-directed again to cover the so-called Silk Route countries. Currently it has 53 member states, including countries like Australia and Canada. Its working groups encompass a range of topics along thematic and geographical lines: reduction of illegal migration, harmonization of pre-entry/entry policies, asylum/irregular migration, return and readmission, the fight against terrorism, Russia/CIS, South-Eastern Europe, Silk Road, and Black Sea. All Eastern European and South Caucasus states, as well as Russia, participate in the Process and benefit from its modalities of work.

It must be mentioned here that ICMPD, the Process secretariat, became a leading intergovernmental organisation in the field of migration management in Eastern Europe and in the broader CIS region. With its few Western but mainly Central European (and more recently Balkan) Member States\(^9\) it has been promoted as a European organization serving European objectives and advocating European integration. This contrasts with the IOM, seen by many in the EU as an American-led body.\(^10\)

Söderköping Process

The Söderköping Process was launched during the Swedish EU Presidency of 2001 as an initiative supporting EU candidate countries (Poland and Lithuania) in meeting their accession goals and enhancing their cooperation on migration management and asylum with Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. It was coordinated by the Swedish Migration Board and animated by the IOM and UNHCR. Its main activities included training for border guards, policy meetings and workshops. In 2004, the geographical focus expanded to support cooperation between Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, on one hand, and Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary and Poland, on the other. Over the last years the Process has helped initiate capacity building in the asylum area between its member states. It also took some steps towards data collection, gathering information on the migration situation of its members, but without regular updates the data soon lost significance. Around 2007, the

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\(^8\) See also http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/main/site/microsites/rcps/budapest-process/Development_of_Budapest_Group_since_Rhodes.pdf


The invention of the Eastern Partnership (see below), with Sweden in leading position, gave the Söderköping Process a second life: in 2011 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia joined. The Process was then integrated to the Panel on Migration and Asylum of the Eastern Partnership in the second half of 2011. This was a rare step towards an Eastern Neighbourhood rationalisation of migration/asylum processes originating from the EU.

The General Directors of Immigration Service Conference

The General Directors of Immigration Service Conference (GDISC) is another outcome of an EU Presidency, this time of the Netherlands in 2004. A Ministerial Conference “Immigration Services Together in the New Europe,” gathering the General Directors of European Immigration Services in a wider Europe\(^{11}\) launched the network. Its primary aim is practical cooperation on migration and asylum, through targeted projects, exchanges of best practice and training. GDISC is, in fact, a network that facilitates applications for funding but which also provides an informal platform for members to pool resources to implement a project. Eastern European states and Russia are not members, but according to its website, over ten different projects on the technical management of migration and asylum have been implemented by participating states in Eastern European countries and Russia since 2004. Many projects have been co-financed by the European Commission and coordinated by the ICMPD or the IOM, and some upgrades of activities of other existing Processes (as Budapest or Söderköping) are also included as GDISC projects. This fact alone shows the level of overlap in the field.

The Prague Process

The Prague Process\(^ {12}\) is another regional process that emerged from the Budapest Process and whose secretariat is run by the ICMPD. It was an ambition of the Czech EU Presidency to create a political being that would both translate its political interests in the CIS into action, and, on the other, leave a mark of the Presidency on the EU agenda. It came out of a project financed by the European Union “Building Migration Partnerships,” involving Schengen and EU countries, all Western Balkan and CIS countries, Georgia, Turkey and Belarus (since December 2010). The leading states are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, currently the Process is chaired by Poland.

The Process was launched with the signature of the Prague Declaration\(^ {13}\) in April 2009. The priorities of cooperation are enshrined in several keyword themes: fight against irregular migration; return (also voluntary), re-admission and reintegration; legal migration, integration labour migration and development; and international protection and asylum policy. The methodology of the Process is based on Budapest Process methodology and generally continues the Budapest working groups. However, it is also done through expert missions (officials of EU administrations, predominantly if not exclusively Ministries of Interior) to the partner countries. It relies too on introducing some relatively new value added items, like work on building up the knowledge base (extended migration profiles of post-Soviet states and I-MAP). It is worth noting that in this Process the idea of partnership and equality is quite well-established: in the Declaration for example not only EU processes and priorities are noted, but also the ones included there by the Russian Federation and other partners. As far as implementation is concerned, e.g. extended migration profiles were prepared not only for CIS countries but also for several EU Member States. By European standards this is unusual, as such processes typically focus on getting and exchanging one-way information, from so-called countries of origin and transit to countries of destination.

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\(^{11}\) Twenty-seven EU Member States, the EU Candidate Countries Croatia and Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland

\(^{12}\) Not to be confused with the Prague Process of negotiations on Nagorno-Karabachu in 2004-2005.

The above enumeration of processes, initiatives and activities existing in the area of migration and asylum policy in Europe since the early 1990s allows for several observations. First, when we take Europe to mean more than the EU, European cooperation on migration is not a sole domain of the EU, in fact, the EU is a latecomer to the field. Second, the intergovernmental tradition of regional consultative processes dominates the discourse and practices of policy transfers between the West and the East of the continent. Third, for almost two decades the topics of cooperation on migration in Europe basically revolved around a repressive vision of migration: the fight against illegal migration flows, border controls, and anti-trafficking measures, with some room for asylum policy. Issues such as labour migration, legal mobility and migration and development have not been commonly discussed (save in the Council of Europe) until very recently.

3. EU-driven cooperation on migration

For present purposes “EU cooperation” means EU-level political commitments, engagement of EU institutions and funding. Even if the intergovernmental character of the long-standing cooperation on the East apparently left no place for independent EU-level policy developments, some attempts to tackle migration was made. The EU has developed a number of initiatives to solidify cooperation and to spread its influence in the field. When looking closer at the content of EU activities, it becomes clear that it has built on ongoing intergovernmental cooperation from the East.

1. Early cooperation on migration

The first step on that road was taken through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) and the Association Agreements signed in the mid- and late 1990s with the countries to the East and South of the EU. These agreements provide a legal framework for political and economic relations between the EU and a partner country in various areas, including migration. However, the substance of the several short references to migration differed according to the country in question. The Association Agreements signed with the countries in Southern Mediterranean mentioned the social dimension of cooperation on migration, legal migration, the root causes of migration and, of course, cooperation on illegal migration. The PCAs signed with Eastern countries mentioned only cooperation on illegal migration.

2. European Neighbourhood Policy

This dichotomy did not disappear with the second step, the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It was launched in 2003, and its principles as well as its working framework for cooperation with Eastern Europe, was described in the Commission’s communication on “Wider Europe”. Migration was included as a part of security policies. Since its inception, ENP to the East (as opposed to the ENP documents for the Southern Mediterranean) talked on migration only in the context of borders, asylum, and illegal migration. This was the case regardless of the Commission communication on cooperation with third-countries in 2002, where it was proposed to align the work on migration to the scientific findings, e.g. as push-pull factors, and thus included the root causes of migration, migrants’ rights and development in the policy response. Subsequent Communications of 2005 on migration and development and the Global Approach of 2006 were also ignored in relation to the East. A holistic view on migration was accepted in relation to Africa and the South Mediterranean. However, this view was not extended to Eastern Europe. It was as if migration had different characteristics in the two geographical locations and migration theories were not applicable to the East. This conceptual limitation had important consequences.

14 Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions
ENP foresees the creation of Action Plans for each partner country. The policy priorities are outlined in Country Strategy Papers and enumerated in National Indicative Strategies, which in turn are the basis for financial planning. If a priority does not appear in these documents, then it can hardly be addressed by the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, the main source of funding. Migration belongs here to the Justice and Home Affairs (JLS) policy sector. The NIPs for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine had different priorities as regards migration: in the case of Armenia for example, the NIP for 2007-2011 only mentions migration in the context of border management in one place, while the NIP for Ukraine and Moldova cover migration issues in more detail. For this simple reason, the funding for cooperation on border management, illegal migration, trafficking and asylum was easily available in the close neighbourhood (Ukraine, Moldova), while until recently issues of migration were not actively taken up by ENP with other Eastern countries. In all cases, the approach focusing on the positive sides of migration has not materialised. The only exception is the NIP for Moldova, whereas of 2008, the positive sides of migration have been linked to the Mobility Partnership.

3. Other forms of cooperation

Eastern Partnership

Eastern Partnership (EaP) is the most recent undertaking that, inter alia, tackles migration and mobility issues. It was established, in 2009, on a Swedish-Polish initiative and it was supported by all the Member states interested in working with the Eastern Neighbourhood, including Belarus. Its structure reflects the typical sectorial approach of EU policy-making, where JLS topics are gathered under the platform 1, Democracy, Good Governance and Stability. It must be underlined, that since its very beginning EaP did not have a migratory component, and the migratory elements of Platform 1 did not at all reflect the general EU migration policy framework (specifically the Global Approach to Migration): it focused on the fight against illegal migration flows and border management instead, leaving out even asylum issues. The flagship initiative of Platform 1 is the Integrated Border Management project which says a lot about the priorities for cooperation. Moreover, the other topics remotely related to migration but called “mobility” are dealt with under other platforms: a “Labour Mobility Study” on the costs and benefits of labour mobility between EU and EaP countries is a deliverable of a Platform on Economic Cooperation.

In December 2011, the Eastern Partnership finally established its migration panel, by introducing under its framework the Söderköping Process. Its role will be to animate discussions on migration and asylum issues under the umbrella of the Partnership. However, it is not clear whether its activities will go beyond the cooperation of Ministries of Interior and take a cross-platform approach.

The Black Sea Synergy

The Black Sea Synergy is another EU process involving countries in Eastern Europe, it was launched in 2008 in Kiev. It works as a more specific instrument for multilateral dialogue with the partners. It uses ENP funding, but it focuses only on a few sectorial policy areas, migration being one of them. However, it is not clear what exactly is being done in the area of migration within this process. In the last report, from 2008, there was a mention of a Black Sea cooperation platform on migration that never, in fact, materialized.

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17 Other sources include TACIS programme (technical assistance), which covered all post-Soviet countries, as well as specific budgetary lines for cooperation on migration and asylum.

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Special JLS arrangements

The Russian Federation and Ukraine have been the most advanced partners: Russia has been involved in EU-Russia Common Space on JLS matters since 2005, with political dialogue and technical cooperation in place\(^9\) while the Ukraine agreed to specific JLS Action Plan in 2006. The content of the Action Plans is quite predictable, following the previous patterns of cooperation. Only in the case of Russia, did the work on legal mobility seem to be a priority for the EU side.

The expectations for increased mobility have been very high, but they still have not been fulfilled, to the point that in the academic circles this instrument is sarcastically called ‘Immobility Partnerships’. Is the criticism justified? What should we do next with the tool? Can it be saved, and most importantly – should it be?

4. Global approach to migration and mobility.

As noted above, in 2007, the year of the extension of the Global Approach to Migration to the East, cooperation on migration issues with Eastern Europe reached saturation point. There were already fifteen years of prior efforts that were not always traceable to EU efforts. What new could have been proposed? The Global Approach to Migration was adopted in response to the crisis in the Mediterranean and offered a policy mix. It blended together tools and objectives of migration policies (e.g. readmission or border management), a development agenda (e.g. work on remittances or counteracting brain-drain) and foreign relations (trust building through dialogue and cooperation).

In this context, in June 2007, the EU extended the Global Approach to Migration to Eastern Europe.\(^{20}\) The extension was justified by so-called geographical balance, i.e. balance between activities, political instruments and funds available to the countries in the South (North and Sub-Saharan Africa) and the East (South-Eastern and Eastern Europe). The idea of geographical balance means that the EU, as an international actor, should keep its interests and engagement equally spread over its close neighbourhood. This approach unfortunately means that the proposed policies are sometimes wasted. In the case of migration, the GAM entered a saturated field. A closer look at the relevant communication confirms that there was not much substance in the Commission’s proposals.

For the Global Approach to Migration as applied to Eastern European countries, the main ideas include: dialogue on migration, engagement in processes at the regional level; the setting up a regional cooperation platform in the Black Sea region; capacity building in various aspects of migration policy; cooperation with FRONTEX and Europol; readmission agreements; visa facilitation agreements; work on migration and development; work on temporary legal migration; and mobility partnerships (especially for the Ukraine). At almost all point for cooperation, it was acknowledged that there was long-established cooperation underway. In fact, the only pure novelty for Eastern Europe were the mobility partnerships.

For Russia, policy goals would include: a dialogue on all aspects of migration policy and implementation of the Road Map of the Common Space on JLS (including discussion of visa-free travel as a long-term objective), readmission and visa facilitation, the fight against illegal immigration, asylum, trafficking in human beings, cooperation with FRONTEX and Europol (a cooperation agreement signed in 2003). Again, a close reading of the Commission’s recommendations showed that nothing new was being proposed.

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\(^{20}\) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions Neighbouring the European Union COM(2007)0247 final)
All in all, there have been so many activities already put in place that the role of the Global Approach would be to serve as a political umbrella:

A key objective in applying the Global Approach to these regions is the need to maintain policy coherence and to ensure complementarity with ongoing dialogue and cooperation initiatives on migration and related areas already taking place in the overall context of EU external relations policy. (p. 16)

Global Approach to Migration moved forward in the East by the means of a so-called toolbox, with several instruments that were not necessarily invented in 2005, but which were taken under the GAM’s umbrella.

Readmission agreements

EU readmission agreements were not immediately seen as handy instruments for the East: after all, Ukraine, for example, had negotiated and signed first readmission agreements with the now EU Member States (Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) as far back as 1994. As, at that time, Central European states were also signing readmission agreements with their Western neighbours (most importantly Germany), and the readmission chain was established without a supra-regional agreement. That was the direct effect of cooperation outside of the EC/EU framework and cooperation within various regional consultative processes undoubtedly supported proliferation of this instrument in Europe. Nevertheless, as of 2000, when the Commission received a mandate for negotiations with Russia, the chain of agreements was gradually replaced by one overarching EU agreement. The agreement with Russia entered into force in 2007, with Ukraine in 2008, Moldova in 2008, and with Georgia in 2010.

Visa facilitation agreements

Visa facilitation is the only EU migration policy instrument that can actually shape flows and bring more mobility from partners and it has been used in precisely this way. To date, EU visa facilitation agreements have been signed with those third countries which had signed readmission agreements. What do these agreements bring? Visa facilitation might sound quite promising, but it does not particularly facilitate movement. It definitely cuts the cost of the visa itself almost in half (from 60 to 35 Euros) and, in some cases, the visa is free (e.g. for short-term students); it provides for shorter processing periods; facilitates visa application process for certain groups of travellers; and facilitates the access to multi-entry visa.\(^{21}\)

It is a policy that can be clearly traced to the EU, but which has not been transferred as the readmission agreements have been. In the case of the Eastern partners, they follow quite different logics in terms of mobility, focusing on freedom of movement rather than visa facilitation policies.

Mobility Partnerships

Mobility Partnerships have been an interesting example of a tool, which success depends not so much on its content or novelty, as on earlier cooperation that prepared the ground for this instrument to flourish. In Europe, EU signed it with the Republic of Moldova (2008), Georgia (2009) and Armenia (2011), (Azerbaijan in preparation). To the date none has been signed with the core countries of Southern Mediterranean or Sub-Saharan Africa.\(^{22}\) The partners (EU Member States, the Commissions, EU agencies and third countries alike) brought under the umbrella of the mobility partnerships a

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\(^{22}\) In 2008 the mobility partnership was signed with Cape Verde, but it is debatable if the country can be fully associated with what is commonly defined as Sub-Saharan Africa. Other attempts to sign a mobility partnership with a country in the region (with Senegal in 2008 and Ghana a year after) have failed. After the Arab spring there might be a clear way to sign the mobility partnership with Morocco by the end of 2012.
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plethora of initiatives, many of them pre-existing under other forms of cooperation developed in Europe. Thus mobility partnerships succeeded to re-organize activities and initiatives bringing more coherence to the field.23

In this context, by 2011 it became clear that Global Approach instruments were more successful in the East than in the South – if measured by a number of readmission agreements implemented and by the number of mobility partnerships signed. But when considering the mapping activity above, the success is relative and it has potentially little to do with EU engagement.

5. EU financial support for practical cooperation in the area of migration policy in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Russia

Considering the above picture of priorities in cooperation, the substance of practical cooperation in the region before the launch of the Global Approach to Migration can easily be deduced. Nevertheless, the exact account is available in the Annex II to the 2007 Commission’s Communication on the extension of the Global Approach to Migration (see below). Pages 40 to 62 contain the most important migration-related projects implemented by the European Union and its Member States in the region (Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Russia) before the entry into force of the Global Approach to Migration between 2000 and 2006. A closer analysis of this content reveals that in that period the EU used TACIS, or B7-667 and the AENEAS programs to fund almost forty projects to the total sum of 66,776,363 Euros. This included ten projects focused on human trafficking; nine on border management; eight on what might be broadly defined as migration management, including capacity building; seven on forces migration, asylum, refugees and protection issues; two projects on readmission; two on labour migration; and one on migration and development.24 Around 40% of all listed projects were implemented by the IOM, 12% by the UNDP and the rest divided among other organizations, such as the ICMPD, the ILO, UNHCR and the Danish Refugee Council.

6. Conclusions

This mapping exercise showed that it is impossible to clearly distinguish the impacts of EU policy in the region: the countries in question have been involved in so many regional and bilateral processes with non-EU actors, that it is impossible to track the developments to EU influence. Even more so, if we consider that in that period the EU itself changed geographically: in 1995 (the so-called Nordic Enlargement) and 2004 (the Eastern Enlargement).

The EU had, however, a clear impact on the ongoing processes in the region. It multiplied patterns of cooperation only to then start rationalising them, trying to gather all the migration-related activities either funded by the EU or Member States to be covered under one umbrella, the Global Approach to Migration. This work has not yet been accomplished.


24 The introduction to Annex II explains that the list is not exhaustive and that: “a) only those projects that were committed through programmes of the previous EU financial framework (2000-2006) are included in the list; b) projects related to development of border infrastructures or addressing customs services or the police forces generically (not specifically the border police) are not included in the list; and c) projects addressing the root causes of migration or trafficking in human beings are not listed.” (p. 20) where point c) is clearly not accurate as ten projects on human trafficking are included in the list. The term “root causes of migration” mean projects on socio-economic development of the countries, and thus are not directly linked with migration.
References


Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions Neighbouring the European Union COM(2007)0247 final)


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