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Developing Circular Mobility: Observations from Ukraine

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National policy-framework¹

Circular migration is becoming an increasingly acceptable concept for contemporary recipient countries in the EU, above all, as an instrumental policy option “minimizing the costs and maximizing the effects”² of international labour force mobility. However, circular migration as a term has never been brought into special focus within the Ukrainian policy framework. Since the mid-2000s, circular migration has risen on the agenda of the UN Global Commission for Migration³, IOM⁴, EU Commission⁵, World Bank⁶ and other leading world actors in the field of international migration and global social development. The concept of circular migration has been regularly addressed in a number of cross-national theoretical discussions and research papers supported by the international organization and developed with the active participation of Ukrainian experts⁷. Yet, circular migration has not been translated into the integrated national policy-framework which so far keeps avoiding “circular migration” employing, instead, the broader “temporary labour migration” [*tymchasova trudova migratsiia*] or the narrower “seasonal work” [*sezonna robota*], “contract job” [*kontraktna robota*], “frontier labour migration” [*prykordonna trudova migratsiia*] and “commutation flows” [*maiatnykova migratsiia*]. It is important to note, however, that the relatively broad range of terms do not – with the exception of “contract job” – rule out illegal forms of temporary labour migration and, therefore, cannot meet the main international criteria of circular migration.

In order to extract a helpful term for policy conceptualization and operation-purposes in the Ukrainian context, one should refer to the basic circular migration definitions. Summing up various approaches developed in the international policy documents and academic discussions, circular migration can be defined as a pattern of voluntary spatial mobility that allows back and forth legal movements between the countries regulated by labour market needs and that is seen as a beneficial solution for both sending and receiving countries, and the migrants themselves⁸.

¹ I wish to express my thanks to Professor Irina Pribytkova for her valuable advice and informative comments for this explanatory note.

² See METOIKOS / Circular migration patterns in Southern and Central Eastern Europe: Challenges and opportunities for migrants and policy makers <http://www.mmg.mpg.de/research/all-projects/metoikos/>

³ See Vertovec S., *Circular Migration: the way forward in global policy?* / Oxford: IMI Working paper, 2007. p.3.

⁴ World Migration 2005. Costs and Benefits of international Migration. – Geneva: IOM, 2005. <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/imi-working-papers/wp4-circular-migration-policy.pdf>

⁵ See EU MEMO 07/197 Circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries. – Brussels, 2007. <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/197>

⁶ See De Ron A., EUROPE: World Bank Promotes ‘Circular Migration’ / IPS, September 7, 2012. <http://www.ipsnews.net/2007/01/europe-world-bank-promotes-circular-migration/>

⁷ See, for example, Markov I. et al., [2010] *Circular Migration: new approaches to the old concepts. Materials of research project* ‘The Elaboration of the Concept Policy of Circular Migration of Ukrainians to the EU Countries through the Cooperation of Expert Communities and Analytical Centres of Ukraine and the EU’ <http://www.navigator.net/public/docs/uploaded/6h00a5b-circular.pdf> [Bilingual version in Ukrainian and English].

⁸ See Vertovec S.(2007), p.2; *Legal Migration and Its Skills Dimensions* // ETF INFORM, 3rd June 2010 <http://www.etf.europa.eu/ETFBlog.nsf/dx/issue05.htm>; Contradiction in terms is not only a Ukrainian problem. As Professor Ronald Skeldon argues, circular migration is widely described and managed as “a form of temporary labour migration”. He emphasizes that “the issue is of central importance to policy makers if they are indeed to take circular migration seriously as a separate form of migration that can be taken forward in the policy debate on managing migration”. See Skeldon R., Paper presented at the Swedish EU Presidency Meeting on Labour Migration and its Development Potential in the Age of Mobility, Malmö, 15-16 October 2009 http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/committees/fccd/Upload/library/skeldon_2010_managing_migration_for_development_-_is_cm_the_answer_en.pdf

The cornerstone difference between Ukrainian and international approaches is the legal status as a basic requirement (this implies that circular migration is governed by policies aimed to regulate the terms of migrants admissions and stay, the ability to hold more than one nationality, or eligibility to obtain permanent residency permit⁹. So far, the temporariness rather than the legal status of migration usually stands at the center of much of national migration discussions in Ukraine; they touch upon various patterns of movements which are circular (to a different city, region or country and return) and can be described as an individual or household strategy aimed at improving material standing but not necessarily bringing “win-win-win results”.

Besides the problems with migration vocabulary, the institutional obstacles towards the elaboration of the state concept of circular migration policy produce complexities of their own. According to the IOM and ILO, the main gaps in the field of labour migration in Ukraine are caused by the absence of a conceptual legal framework on national policy and management. It is acutely noted that “the existing policy documents have a declarative character focusing on the need for their creation rather than on clearly cut outlined mechanisms and feasible tools for implementation”¹⁰. Among the other shortcomings of circular migration policy-making we might include: 1) the absence of coordination between agencies involved in data collection on different types of temporary labour migration and, as a result, a failure to understand the real scope of the problem; 2) no consistency in migration policies at the state level and no efficient mechanism of cooperation with international organizations in Ukraine that might promote circular migration and that might initiate further collaborative work. Since the Kuchma presidency, notably during his first term (1994-1999), national priorities have included the strengthening of Ukraine as an independent state and a reliable partner on the international stage. As a result, most key migration documents and executive agreements were signed in cooperation with the foreign plenipotentiaries in that period.¹¹ Later on, during Kuchma’s second term (1999-2005) and during the Yuschenko presidency (2005-2010) the principles of collaboration became more and more superficial, top level discussions rarely yielding any improvements in migration legislation and management. Since the Yanukovich presidency (starting from 2010), the principles of mutual understanding and good will seem to have been even further debased. Notably, in his numerous interviews before the end of his term, the EU Representative in Ukraine José Manuel Pinto Teixeira pointed out that during the four years of his mission in Ukraine (2008-2012) he had not had a single meeting with the Ukrainian president.¹² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ reaction to Mr. Teixeira’s criticism of the sluggish attitude of the Ukrainian authorities towards cooperation with the EU was in itself interesting. The representative of the Ministry suggested that Mr. Teixeira’s comments “should rather refer to Cape Verde where he is sent on his next mission”¹³. Similarly, the other geopolitical dimensions of international dialogue (including the CIS and third countries) remain heavily biased towards non-binding assurances of commitment to shared values and strategic partnership or, more often, meet a wide range of pressing macroeconomic demands. Obviously, circular migrants will never

⁹ Newland K., *Circular Migration and Human Development* / UNDP Human Development Research Paper, 2009/42, pp.1-2.

¹⁰ *Migration Trends and Policies in the Black Sea Region: cases of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine* / Institute of Public Policy, 2008. p.43. Authors refer to the original citation in IOM (2006) Labour Migration Assessment for the WNIS Region. International Organization for Migration, p.8.

¹¹ This can be illustrated, for example, by the fact that concrete steps towards the elaboration of migration legislation were successfully initiated by the Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Jozsef Dörke who personally discussed urgent issues with the Ukrainian President (it is worth mentioning that during his mission he had been awarded an honorary diploma by the Ukrainian cabinet for his “valuable personal contribution to finding out solutions of migration problems”. See <http://www.uazakon.com/document/spart55/inx55402.htm> A number of executive agreements in the field of labour migration between Ukraine and third countries were signed in that period (as they were not subject to the constitutional requirement for ratification, they soon have become effective).

¹² See Interview with José Manuel Pinto Teixeira:
http://www.interfax.ru/txt.asp?id=263509&sec=1483&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

¹³ See LB-UA news, August 30, 2012, downloaded 18 September, 2012 from
http://lb.ua/news/2012/08/30/168272_midu_mnenie_teysheri_sovsem.html

become a subject of law and management in Ukraine until the issue of circular migration is fully addressed at the highest state level, and the Ukrainian government proves capable of being a reliable and consistent partner accountable to the standard rules, regulations and principles of communication and interaction with the international community. For the time being, the top Ukrainian authorities are fully preoccupied with the forthcoming election campaign. And the administrative chaos of numerous state bodies, agencies and departments dealing with migration is reaffirmed by the ceaseless rotations which have become a widespread but not very logical personnel policy in the last decade. In this unfortunate situation Ukrainian circular migrants has become the subject of research for academics and NGOs' alone. Circular migrants' dynamics evolve regardless of the country's remote policies. As a result of the in-depth studies, those migrants who work abroad on a temporary basis are not very well aware of the policy discussions, they do not rely on Ukrainian law and rarely expect support from the Ukrainian state¹⁴. Migrants rather rely on themselves and their experience, they establish personal links and community networks where possible, they apply for help from various private mediators and sensitively react to changing labour demands. Involuntary unemployment in origin countries and global recession remain, so far, the main driving forces of circular mobility.

Envisaging the directions of circular mobility: going from and coming to Ukraine

Obviously, the lack of a comprehensive nationally adopted definition of circular migration entails many traps. This is particularly evident if one seeks to analyse the directions of circular mobility. A considerable obstacle here is the illegal character of most movements that remains an important disadvantage for working Ukrainians going abroad: circular migrants are neither a subject of regular state agency reports nor focus of NGO data collection. Certainly, to compensate for the lack of reliable data, a research focus can be placed on exploring the subjective dimensions of the phenomenon by means of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Yet, within this approach, not only aspirations and strategies for realising different migration goals and patterns but also the assessment of actions needs to be explored.

It should be emphasised that no study has been done so far to estimate circular mobility in Ukraine as there is not a simple or a single approach to such a study. Migration aspirations and plans do not directly correlate with movements. Thus, one cannot address the question by drawing upon survey data. Obviously, only migration statistics together with panel studies (enabling us to trace changes in concrete households) can shed some light on the confusing picture of "migration aspirations and claims". Still, again, it is very unlikely that circular migrants and mobility will become subject for research analyses and policy monitoring until they are properly categorised. In concrete terms, we need, first of all, to define what group or groups can be referred to as circular migrants in Ukraine. Should it be only those who move back and forth legally or, in a broader and far-reaching policy-oriented sense, should those who can potentially become legal be targeted, too: i.e. the group of migrants that seeks legal status but fail to obtain it due to the lack of circular migration policies between Ukraine, the CIS and the EU countries¹⁵?

No socio-political estimates can be detached from the available official migration figures provided by the state agencies responsible for the analysis of the migration situation. Overall, according to the

¹⁴ This is illustrated by the rich data of the in-depth interviews with return migrants and family members of the actual migrants conducted within the THEMIS research project in 2011-2012. The results will be published in early 2013.

¹⁵ As stated on the Ukrainian Governmental portal in June 2012, "at present, Ukraine is a party to the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, the Agreement on Cooperation in the field of labor migration and social protection of migrant workers, the Protocol to the Agreement, which governs the processes of border migration within the CIS, Convention on Legal Status of Migrant Workers and their family members of the CIS; also, Ukraine is a party in 13 bilateral agreements on employment and social protection of migrant workers and 8 bilateral agreements on social security". Still, the remaining task is to "extend the contractual framework" with the main destination countries in the CIS and EU. See http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=245370738&cat_id=244314975

estimates of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy which is in charge of monitoring labour migration and which registers labour migrants¹⁶ and the estimates of experts, only 2 to 3 percent of the actual number of migrants is captured by official statistics¹⁷. Data are considered to be more reliable for foreign migrants, a significant share of whom study or work in Ukraine legally. A majority of immigrants come from CIS countries. According to the available data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs¹⁸, most foreign nationals which came to Ukraine are Russian nationals (up to 25% of foreigners). The second and the third largest groups are citizens of China (9%) and Turkey (5%). These are followed by the citizens of other CIS countries: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Moldova (around 4% for each group), Armenia and Belarus (2%). Other legal resident groups include Syrians, Jordanians, Indians, Iranians and migrants from Vietnam (up to 2% each). In 2008 there were about 264,000 foreigners registered in Ukraine¹⁹. Different estimates on the total number of immigrants, both legal and illegal, roughly reach half a million, so, the share of estimated unregistered migrants is smaller than the registered ones. The regions most populated by legal immigrants are Kyiv (the capital), Donetsk, Kharkiv and Odesa. Immigrants are mainly employed in retail trade, construction and agriculture²⁰. Unfortunately, no supplementary data which would tell us more about the mobility dynamics of immigrants is available. Consequently, it is hard to estimate accurately the share of foreigners who can be properly defined as circular migrants. Obviously, the economic situation in the origin country as well as many other personal and environmental aspects influence their motivation, behaviour and future plans. Without special studies (surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews) it is also very difficult to predict how this situation will evolve. Most experts argue that the immigration situation in Ukraine is rather stable with a certain point of equilibrium²¹.

For Ukrainians settings are different: only a small share of them, including those who remain Ukrainian citizens and who work abroad temporarily and legally on the basis of labour contacts with a mediator agency or employer, are taken into consideration of the State Employment Centres and reflected in the national statistics (see Figure 1). Although the data are not accurate, they still reflect the trend, i.e. the number of labour migrants from Ukraine tends to increase as long as the economic situation in the country remains unstable. The Russian Federation is the most popular place of employment (see Figure 2)²², particularly for Russian-speaking Ukrainians from Eastern and Southern Ukraine. But the decision to become a labour migrant in the EU or a third country is often supported by the possibility of gaining a legal status in the states which initiated the legalization process including Portugal, Italy and Spain²³. Also, people in the Western border zone opt for circular labour

¹⁶ Both citizens of Ukraine who temporarily work abroad and foreigners employed in Ukraine fill out the special registration forms, correspondently – 1-TM- and 2-TM where “TM” is an abbreviation for labour migrant [*trudovyi migrant*]. Specifically, in 2007 Ukrainians employed abroad via licensed mediators made up around 73,000 (around 2 percent of the estimated number of Ukrainians working abroad). See http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/50/33/Migration_ENG.pdf

¹⁷ According to a World Bank report published in 2007 Ukraine ranks third on the list of sending countries, following the Russian Federation and Mexico, ahead of India and China, and fourth on the list of receiving countries, after the US, the Russian Federation and Germany.

(See *Migration Trends and Policies in the Black Sea Region: cases of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine* / Institute of Public Policy, 2008. p. 34). See http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/50/33/Migration_ENG.pdf

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 35- 36.

¹⁹ Ibid.


²⁰ *Migration Trends and Policies in the Black Sea Region: cases of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine* / Institute of Public Policy, 2008. p. 36.

²¹ See Documents security and Migration Policy: assessments and recommendations of the international working groups for Ukraine / Europe without Barriers, International Renaissance Foundation, Kiev, 2011. pp.6, 9, 10.

²² See also main destination countries of Ukrainian labour migrants with gender distribution in 2005-2008: *Migration in Ukraine: facts and figures* / IOM Mission in Ukraine, 2011, p.3 http://iom.org.ua/en/pdf/Facts&Figures_b5_en_f.pdf


²³ Pribytkova I., unpublished comment to the METOIKOS experts' questionnaire on circular migration.

migration to neighbouring EU countries with better job opportunities: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. It is worth underlining that in recent years, maritime states are becoming the most popular circular employment destinations. International ship owners flying the flags of Cyprus, Greece, Germany, the US, Liberia, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and Poland hire Ukrainian sailors: these, according to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, currently make up nearly 90 percent of all registered labour migrants²⁴.



Source: Data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of Ukraine given in Labour Migration Assessment for the WNIS Region / IOM, Kiev, 2007. – p.10 and European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Ukraine: national indicative programme 2011-2013 / European Union, 2011, p.44.
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf

²⁴ See Delo (2007). “Український флот моряков-остарбайтерів”, 13 February, 2007, <http://delo.ua/business/ukrainskij-flot-morjakov-ostar-20223/>



Source: Labour Migration Assessment for the WNIS Region / IOM, Kiev, 2007, p.11.

Obviously, the above-mentioned figures cannot give us the true scope of circular migration. According to the estimates of the Ukrainian expert group led by Igor Markov, based on on-line experts interviews: “typologically, Ukrainians [are involved in] circular migration” assuming that “more than 80% of them plan to return home; nearly 70% have families in Ukraine and maintain close contacts with their relatives in the homeland while staying abroad; 90% of them realize Ukraine-oriented plans (buy real estate, pay for their children’s education, etc.)”²⁵. Following these assumptions based on the surveys and taking into account that, according to IOM data²⁶, the number of labour migrants from Ukraine is 2.1 million, or about 5% of the Ukraine’s population, potential circular migrants might stand at more than 1,5 million. Apparently, not all migrants, undertaking circular trips, have legal status (though, they can be considered as potential circular migrants if they are registered). Also, some labour migrants with legal status in the country of residence are underpaid and cannot cover their regular travels back home. Alternatively, they have insecure jobs and are not allowed to leave. As a result, even if they originally planned to be abroad for some time and return home, they are forced to stay longer for financial or other personal reasons. As we have seen during the in-depth interviews with return migrants from Western Europe²⁷, most of them had undertaken one or two trips and have returned back home for good after their tourist visa expired or after they had encountered problems with mediation companies (for example, companies lost licenses and were not in a position to arrange further trips). Periods in host countries were often short-term, making proper integration in the new environment impossible: up to six month of hard work, with no considerable professional up-grade,

²⁵ See Markov I. et al., [2010] *Circular Migration: new approaches to the old concepts. Materials of research project ‘The Elaboration of the Concept Policy of Circular Migration of Ukrainians to the EU Countries through the Cooperation of Expert Communities and Analytical Centres of Ukraine and the EU’*, p.9.
<http://www.navigator.net/public/docs/uploaded/6h0oa5b-circular.pdf> [Bilingual version in Ukrainian and English]

²⁶ Labour Migration Assessment for the WNIS Region / IOM, Kiev, 2006, p.5.

²⁷ This research was carried out within the THEMIS project sponsored by the University of Oxford 2011-2012 with migrants who returned to Ukraine from the UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.

little communication with the locals and no interim trips back home. If trips were long-term there is a high risk of isolation from the family in Ukraine (up to several years with rare visits home during holidays, usually once a year). Again, illegality was the most apparent disadvantages for migrants which made them a subject to abuse on the border and prevented circular trips.

The development of circular mobility in the future: moving to Russia, the EU or third countries?

As sociologist Irina Pribytkova argues, the future space of circular mobility (opportunities and intentions) is created by the scope of offers in: employment, housing, education, leisure time, communication, recreation, various environmental characteristics, level of political stability, personal security and human rights. “People are looking for the best places”, this is the main principle of the “self-organized process of social behaviour of individuals”²⁸. In terms of analysing future mobility trends, Pribytkova has suggested a very useful instrument for measuring circular mobility which she developed, tested and applied several years ago within the survey *Ukrainian Society: Monitoring the Changes*, in cooperation with methodologist Natalya Panina²⁹. According to her approach, the real circular migrant are those who have travelled abroad three times or more (see Table 1)³⁰.

Table 1. “How many times have you travelled abroad for temporary work?”, in %.

	2005	2006	2008	2010	2012
Never	91.7	89.5	89.9	91.6	90.8
Once	3.4	4.7	4.2	3.3	3.3
Two times	1.7	2.2	1.5	1.4	2.1
Three times	0.8	1.1	0.8	0.4	1.0
More than three times	2.0	2.2	3.3	2.2	2.2
No answer	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.1	0.6

Source: Results of the survey “Ukrainian society 1992-2012”, Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine.

Table 2. “Do you plan to go abroad for temporary work during the next year (2005-2012)?”, in %.

	2005	2006	2008	2010	2012
Yes	6.3	6.1	6.2	6.2	5.3
No	93.6	93.6	93.7	93.7	94.0
No answer	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.7

Source: Results of the survey “Ukrainian society 1992-2012”, Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine.


Those who have been abroad once or twice usually hesitate to go abroad again since they have not established any networks for regular travel and feel uncertain as to future movements during the year to come (see Table 2 and Figure 3). As the data suggest (though for a relatively small group of respondents), the number of “circular migrants” in 2012 was equal to that in 2008. This tendency is explained by the deteriorating economic situation in those years: less stable than in 2010 when the

²⁸ See Pribytkova I., Пространственная самоорганизация населения: теоретико-методологические предпосылки исследования // Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. - 2009. - №4 [Spatial self-organisation of population: theoretic and methodological preconditions of research] http://www.i-soc.com.ua/institute/pb_07.pdf [in Ukrainian]

²⁹ Ibid. See also *Ukrainian Society: Sociological Monitoring (1994-2004)*, Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine, 2004. p.35. Survey is conducted annually. The nationwide random sample represents the adult population of Ukraine according to sex, age, ethnicity and type of community (city, town, village). The sampling error does not exceed 2.3 percent.

³⁰ Drawn from the Institute of Sociology of Ukraine survey results (SPSS dataset).

number of respondents, who travelled abroad several times, fell away somewhat. On average, “circular migrants” make up around 3 percent of the sample.



Source: Results of the survey ‘Ukrainian society 1992-2010’, Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine.

This is a stable group which includes mainly middle-aged married adults. Looking at the longitudinal results of the survey³¹, one can estimate that Russia will remain the most popular destination for potential circular migrants from the largely pro-Russian East. This is mainly a question of geo-political, cultural, language and family reasons. However, a decrease of circular migrants to the CIS will be a continuing tendency: compare 12.7% of those who were planning to leave for Russia in 1994 to 8.3% in 2010, to other CIS countries at 1.1-1.2 through 1994-2010. Most active Ukrainian migrants from the Western regions will persistently opt for the neighbouring EU countries. Indeed, the share of Ukrainians who circularly move to the EU area with “better employment opportunities and higher life standards” will increase gradually; as also observed in the previous years, those who were going to leave for non-CIS countries made up 4.6 percent in 1994 and 7.9 in 2010³². Circular movement between Ukraine and third countries (non-CIS and non-EU) will remain sparse, except for the maritime areas. Desire to find a new job and improve quality of life will be, just as in the previous years, an increasingly important driving force of circular mobility³³.

By and large, circular mobility is a self-administered phenomenon regulated by very complex individually driven mechanisms: by family-to-community relations, personal values and emotional settings (on the micro-level) as well as by access to resources and local labour market opportunities (on the meso-level). Each potential migrant personally “develops one’s human and social capital and evaluate... the benefits accruing to oneself and their immediate kin in terms of projected life course”³⁴. Consequently, it is hard to predict accurately how circular migration will evolve within the next

³¹ *Ukrainian Society: Sociological Monitoring (1994-2010)*, Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine, 2011.

³² Ibid.567.

³³ Ibid, p.568

³⁴ Marshall V., Heinz W., at al. (eds.), *Restructuring Work and Life Course*, University of Toronto Press, 2001, -537.

decade: any change in the economic and political situation, in the media environment, in community attitudes, etc. can trigger news shifts in migration systems.

However, experts assume that ensuring legal provisions for the development of circular migration as a specific form of migration, beneficial to an individual and all participating agents, will serve as a powerful spur to the sustainability of the world labour market. Doing this will influence individual aspirations, plans and decision-making (“it’s better to work abroad but return home”³⁵). For all circular migrants (who move legally, voluntary and beneficially) migration should be ensured as free and secure “movement-on-demand” provided by the host country. It also should imply that “returning home” makes a promising life perspective guaranteed by the law in the country of origin.

In the case of Ukraine, under the current economic circumstances in the EU, CIS and worldwide circular migrants should be fully prepared to fill the employment niches not advantageous for the national labour force. They should think twice about the possible benefits and losses for themselves. In this respect, both the Ukrainian state and our international partners should be well-informed (more interdisciplinary research on the issue is needed) and fully committed to concrete rather than formal tasks and responsibilities in the field of circular migration. This means more bilateral policy initiatives at governmental level as well as the elaboration of contractual frameworks with the main destination countries.

³⁵ This is illustrated by the interviews with the children of migrants conducted in Lviv within the CARIM project in March 2012. Also, according to the data presented by the Korrespondent journal in 2011: 79 percent of Ukrainians were interested in signing terminal labour contracts with foreign employers. See <http://korrespondent.net/business/economics/1286838-opros-70-ukraincev-hoteli-by-rabotat-za-rubezhom>